Physiology, Vitalism, and the Contest for Body and Soul in the Antebellum United States.

In the early nineteenth century, physiology became an increasingly popular and powerful science in the United States. Religious controversy over the nature of human vitality animated much of this interest. On one side of these debates stood Protestant apologists who wedded an immaterialist vitalism to their belief in an immaterial, immortal soul - and therefore to their dreams of a Christian republic. On the other side, religious skeptics argued for a materialist vitalism that excluded anything immaterial from human life, aspiring thereby to eliminate religious interference in the progress of science and society. Both sides hoped that by claiming physiology for their vision of human nature they might direct the future of religion in the US. Ultimately, they failed to realize these ambitions, but their contest posed a dilemma late nineteenth-century physiologists felt compelled to solve: how should they comprehend the relationship between life, body, and soul? Eager to undertake laboratory work and leave metaphysical questions behind, these researchers solved the problem by restricting their work to the body while leaving spiritual matters to preachers. In attempting to escape the vitalism and soul questions, late nineteenth-century Americans thus created a division of labor that shaped the history of medicine and religion for the following century.

The third-way third wave and the enduring appeal of bioexceptionalism.

We may induce from a longue durée examination of Anglo-American History of Biology that the impulse to reject reduc - tionism persists and will continue to percolate cyclically. This impulse I deem "bioexceptionalism": an intuition, stance, attitude, or activating metaphor that the study of living beings requires explanations in addition to exclusively bottom-up causal explanations and the research programs constructed upon that bottom-up philosophical foundation by non-organismal biologists, biochemists, and biophysicists - the explanations, in other words, that Wadding - ton (1977) humorously termed the "Conventional Wisdom of the Dominant Group, or cowdung." Bioexceptionalism might indicate an ontological assertion, like vitalism. Yet most often in the last century, it has been defined by a variety of methodological or even sociological positions. On three occasions in the interval from the late nineteenth century to the present, a small but significant group of practicing biologists and allies in other research disciplines in the UK and US adopted a species of bioexceptionalism, rejecting the dominant explanatory philosophy of reductionistic mechanism. Yet they also rejected the vitalist alternative. We can refer to their subset of bioexceptionalism as a "Third-Way" approach, though participants at the time called it by a variety of names, including "organicism." Today's appeals to a Third-Way are but the latest eruption of this older dissensus and retain at least heuristic value apart from any explanatory success.

Locating hygienic medicine within the intellectual history of hygiene: cases of E. W. Lane and T. R. Allinson.

Nineteenth century hygiene might be a confusing concept. On the one hand, the concept of hygiene was gradually becoming an important concept that was focused on cleanliness and used interchangeably with sanitation. On the other hand, the classical notions of hygiene rooted in the Hippocratic teachings remained influential. This study is about two attempts to newly theorise such a confusing concept of hygiene in the second half of the century by Edward. W. Lane and Thomas R. Allinson. Their works, standing on the borders of self-help medical advice and theoretical treatises on medical philosophies, were not exactly scholarly ones, but their medical thoughts - conceptualised as hygienic medicine - show a characteristically holistic medical view of hygiene, a nineteenth-century version of the reinterpretation of the nature cure philosophy and vitalism. However, the aim of this study is to properly locate their conceptualisations of hygienic medicine within the historical context of the second half of the nineteenth century rather than to simply introduce the medical ideas in their books. Their views of hygiene were distinguished not only from the contemporary sanitary approach but also from similar attempts by contemporary orthodox and unorthodox medical doctors. Through a chronological analysis of changes in the concept of hygiene and a comparative analysis of these two authors' and other medical professionals' views of hygiene, this paper aims to help understand the complicated picture of nineteenth-century hygiene, particularly during the second half of the century, from the perspective of medical holism and reductionism.

From Organismic Biology as History and Philosophy to the History and Philosophy of Biology-the Work of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger in the German Context.

In this paper, I ask about the broader context of the history and philosophy of biology in the German-speaking world as the place in which Hans-Jörg Rheinberger began his work. Three German philosophical traditions-neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, and Lebensphilosophie-were interested in the developments and conceptual challenges of the life sciences in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their reflections were taken up by life scientists under the terms theoretische Biologie (theoretical biology) and allgemeine Biologie (general biology), i. e., for theoretical and methodological reflections. They used historical and philosophical perspectives to develop vitalistic, organicist, or holistic approaches to life. In my paper, I argue that the resulting discourse did not come to an end in 1945. Increasingly detached from biological research, it formed an important context for the formation of the field of history and philosophy of biology. In Rheinberger's work, we can see the "Spalten" and "Fugen"-the continuities and discontinuities-that this tradition left there.

Vitalism, Holism, and Metaphorical Dynamics of Hans Spemann's "Organizer" in the Interwar Period.

This paper aims to provide a fresh historical perspective on the debates on vitalism and holism in Germany by analyzing the work of the zoologist Hans Spemann (1869-1941) in the interwar period. Following up previous historical studies, it takes the controversial question about Spemann's affinity to vitalistic approaches as a starting point. The focus is on Spemann's holistic research style, and on the shifting meanings of Spemann's concept of an organizer. It is argued that the organizer concept unfolded multiple layers of meanings (biological, philosophical, and popular) during the 1920s and early 1930s. A detailed analysis of the metaphorical dynamics in Spemann's writings sheds light on the subtle vitalistic connotations of his experimental work. How Spemann's work was received by contemporary scientists and philosophers is analyzed briefly, and Spemann's holism is explored in the broader historical context of the various issues about reductionism and holism and related methodological questions that were so prominently discussed not only in Germany in the 1920s.

Vitalism in contemporary chiropractic: a help or a hinderance?

BACKGROUND: Chiropractic emerged in 1895 and was promoted as a viable health care substitute in direct competition with the medical profession. This was an era when there was a belief that one cause and one cure for all disease would be discovered. The chiropractic version was a theory that most diseases were caused by subluxated (slightly displaced) vertebrae interfering with "nerve vibrations" (a supernatural, vital force) and could be cured by adjusting (repositioning) vertebrae, thereby removing the interference with the body's inherent capacity to heal. DD Palmer, the originator of chiropractic, established chiropractic based on vitalistic principles. Anecdotally, the authors have observed that many chiropractors who overtly claim to be "vitalists" cannot define the term. Therefore, we sought the origins of vitalism and to examine its effects on chiropractic today. DISCUSSION: Vitalism arose out of human curiosity around the biggest questions: Where do we come from? What is life? For some, life was derived from an unknown and unknowable vital force. For others, a vital force was a placeholder, a piece of knowledge not yet grasped but attainable. Developments in science have demonstrated there is no longer a need to invoke vitalistic entities as either explanations or hypotheses for biological phenomena. Nevertheless, vitalism remains within chiropractic. In this examination of vitalism within chiropractic we explore the history of vitalism, vitalism within chiropractic and whether a vitalistic ideology is compatible with the legal and ethical requirements for registered health care professionals such as chiropractors. CONCLUSION: Vitalism has had many meanings throughout the centuries of recorded history. Though only vaguely defined by chiropractors, vitalism, as a representation of supernatural force and therefore an untestable hypothesis, sits at the heart of the divisions within chiropractic and acts as an impediment to chiropractic legitimacy, cultural authority and integration into mainstream health care.

A Vital Mediation: The Sanatorium, before and after Antibiotics.

As drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis spread across India, commentators have warned that we are returning to the sanatorium era. Such concerns might be symptomatically read in terms of loss; however, prophecies of return might also signal that there is something to be regained. Rather than lamenting the end of the antibiotic era, I shift the focus to ask about the sanatorium, not simply as a technology of the past, but as a technology of an imminent future. In examining late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century conversations about treating tuberculosis in India, I demonstrate how the the sanatorium was figured as a therapeutic technology that mediated the relationship between the body and its colonial milieu. In this light, I argue that contemporary prophecies of a future past register not simply the loss of antibiotic efficacy, but also a desire to return to a therapeutics that foregrounds issues of vitality, mediation, and environment.

Instrumental causes and the natural origin of souls in Antonio Ponce Santacruz's theory of animal generation.

This article studies the theory of animal seeds as purely material entities in the early seventeenth-century medical writings of Antonio Ponce Santacruz, royal physician to the Spanish king Philipp IV. Santacruz adopts the theory of the eduction of substantial forms from the potentiality of matter, according to which new kinds of causal powers can arise out of material composites of a certain complexity. Santacruz stands out among the late Aristotelian defenders of eduction theory because he applies the concept of an instrument of direction developed by the medieval Avicenna commentator Gentile da Foligno and gives a novel turn to this concept by interpreting animal seeds as separate instruments. The article situates Santacruz's theory in the context of early modern debates about the concept of the eduction of forms, as well as in the context of early modern debates about the concept of separate instruments. Particular attention is paid to Santacruz's responses to the biological views of Julius Caesar Scaliger and Thomas Feyens. Santacruz's response to Scaliger turns out to be central for his explication of the eduction relation, and Santacruz's response to Feyens turns out to be central for his explication of the nature of instrumental causation.

Revisiting the Pouchet-Pasteur controversy over spontaneous generation: understanding experimental method.

Louis Pasteur's defeat of belief in spontaneous generation has been a classical rationalist example of how the experimental approach of modern science can reveal superstition. Farley and Geison (Bull Hist Med 48:161-198, 1974) told a counter-story of how Pasteur's success was due to political and ideological support rather than superior experimental science. They claimed that Pasteur violated proper norms of scientific method, and that the French Academy of Science did not see this, or did not want to. Farley and Geison argued that Pouchet's experiments were as valid as those of Pasteur. In this paper I argue that the core of the scientific debate was not general theories for or against spontaneous generation but the outcome of specific experiments. It was on the conduct of these experiments that the Academy made judgements favorable to Pasteur. Claude Bernard was a colleague of Pasteur, supportive and sometimes critical. I argue that Bernard's fact-oriented methodology of "experimental medicine" is a better guide to explaining the controversy than the hypothetic-deductive view of scientific method typical of logical empiricism.

Introduction: sketches of a conceptual history of epigenesis.

This is an introduction to a collection of articles on the conceptual history of epigenesis, from Aristotle to Harvey, Cavendish, Kant and Erasmus Darwin, moving into nineteenth-century biology with Wolff, Blumenbach and His, and onto the twentieth century and current issues, with Waddington and epigenetics. The purpose of the topical collection is to emphasize how epigenesis marks the point of intersection of a theory of biological development and a (philosophical) theory of active matter. We also wish to show that the concept of epigenesis existed prior to biological theorization and that it continues to permeate thinking about development in recent biological debates.

A non-metaphysical evaluation of vitalism in the early twentieth century.

In biology the term "vitalism" is usually associated with Hans Driesch's doctrine of the entelechy: entelechies were nonmaterial, bio-specific agents responsible for governing a few peculiar biological phenomena. Since vitalism defined as such violates metaphysical materialism (or physicalism), the received view refutes the doctrine of the entelechy as a metaphysical heresy. But in the early twentieth century, a different, non-metaphysical evaluation of vitalism was endorsed by some biologists and philosophers, which finally led to a logical refutation of the doctrine of the entelechy. In this non-metaphysical evaluation, first, vitalism was not treated as a metaphysical heresy but a legitimate response to the inadequacy of mechanistic explanations in biology. Second, the refutation of vitalism was logically rather than metaphysically supported by contemporary biological knowledge. The entelechy was not a valid concept, because vitalists could neither formulate vital laws (to attribute determinate consequences to the entelechy), nor offer convincing examples of experimental indeterminism (to confirm the perpetual inadequacy of mechanistic explanations).

The schism in chiropractic through the eyes of a 1st year chiropractic student.

Since its inception, the chiropractic profession has been divided along ideological fault lines. These divisions have led to a profession wide schism, which has limited mainstream acceptance, utilisation, social authority and integration. The authors explore the historical origins of this schism, taking time to consider historical context, religiosity, perpetuating factors, logical fallacies and siege mentality. Evidence is then provided for a way forward, based on the positioning of chiropractors as mainstream partners in health care.

Laws of organization and chemical analysis: Blainville and Müller.

When "general physiology" emerged as a basic field of research within biology in the early nineteenth century, Henri Ducrotay de Blainville (1777-1850) on the one hand and Johannes Peter Müller (1801-1858) on the other appealed to chemical analysis to account for the properties and operations of organisms that were observed to differ from what was found in inorganic compounds. Their aim was to establish laws of vital organization that would be based on organic chemical processes, but would also be of use to explain morphological and functional differences among life forms. The intent of this paper is to specify for each of these leading physiologists the different presuppositions that provided theoretical frameworks for their interpretation of what they conceived of as laws of organization underpinning the dynamics of vital phenomena. Blainville presumed that the properties of organic compounds depended on the chemical properties of their constitutive molecules, but combined according to patterns of functional development, and that the latter could only be inferred from an empirical survey of modes of organization across the spectrum of life forms. For Müller, while all vital processes involved chemical reactions, in the formative and functional operations of organisms, these reactions would result from the action of life forces that were responsible for the production of organic combinations and thus for vital and animal functions. As both physiologists set significant methodological patterns for their many disciples and followers, their respective quasi-reductionist and anti-reductionist positions need to be accounted for.

Synthetic biology. A tribute to S. Leduc (1853-1939, Nantes, France) and an Answer to the Return of Vitalism.

A very large number of articles about vitalism have been published since 1894 in the journal Science. Vitalism is a theory according to which living organisms appear to possess something more than inanimate objects. The "vital principle" is minted in 1778 by Barthez in "Les nouveaux éléments de la science de l'homme", (Stahl talks of phlogiston for chemistry). In their view, the life of the whole is not the simple sum of the life of the components. Such a view was hatched in response to the Cartesian mechanist interpretation of living matter as proposed by Galileo and Descartes. Vitalist intuition was revived in the XXth century by new researchers such as Henri Bergson ("l'élan vital" or 'vital force') in France and Hans Driesch ("entelechy") in Germany. Could this view of life now be making a comeback in biology?

Toward a Pragmatist Epistemology: Arthur O. Lovejoy's and H. S. Jennings's Biophilosophical Responses to Neovitalism, 1909-1914.

The sustained interdisciplinary debate about neovitalism between two Johns Hopkins University colleagues, philosopher Arthur O. Lovejoy and experimental geneticist H. S. Jennings, in the period 1911-1914, was the basis for their theoretical reconceptualization of scientific knowledge as contingent and necessarily incomplete in its account of nature. Their response to Hans Driesch's neovitalist concept of entelechy, and his challenge to the continuity between biology and the inorganic sciences, resulted in a historically significant articulation of genetics and philosophy. This study traces the debate's shift of problem-focus away from neovitalism's threat to the unity of science - "organic autonomy," as Lovejoy put it - and toward the potential for development of a nonmechanististic, nonrationalist theory of scientific knowledge. The result was a new pragmatist epistemology, based on Lovejoy's and Jennings's critiques of the inadequacy of pragmatism's account of scientific knowledge. The first intellectual move, drawing on naturalism and pragmatism, was based on a reinterpretation of science as organized experience. The second, sparked by Henri Bergson's theory of creative evolution, and drawing together elements of Dewey's and James's pragmatisms, produced a new account of the contingency and necessary incompleteness of scientific knowledge. Prompted by the neovitalists' mix of a priori concepts and, in Driesch's case, and adherence to empiricism, Lovejoy's and Jennings's developing pragmatist epistemologies of science explored the interrelation between rationalism and empiricism.

IL PROBLEMA DELL'«ANIMA DEI BRUTI¼ NELL'OPERA DI ALESSANDRO PASCOLI: DA CARTESIO AL VITALISMO.

By means of the analysis of three works (Dell'anima de' bruti [Of the soul of beasts], Sofilo Molossio, and Sofilo senza maschera [Sofilo without a mask]) of Alessandro Pascoli (1669-1757), the psysician and philosopher from Perugia, the article reconstructs his fluctuating thought with regard to the problem of sensation in animals, indicated as the problem of the "soul of beasts." Regarding this question, Pascoli oscillates between, on the one hand, the Cartesian theory, which considered animals similar to mechanical automatons, devoid of the capacity to experience sensations (that is say, devoid of "sensitivity"); and, on the other hand, the Church's scholastic-peripatetic doctrine that attributed to animals the capacity to feel, thus affirming the presence in them of a "sensitive soul," considered -as compared with the human one -imperfect, material, and mortal. In expounding the reasons and argumentations of the Cartesians, on the one hand, and of the ecclesiastic teachings, on the other, Pascoli manifests a substantial convergence with the former, but also the need, inasmuch as Catholic professor of medicine at the Sapienza University of Rome, to not deny the possibility of the latter. In this tormented and contorted alternation of opinions, between the thesis of the animal-machine and that of the animal gifted with a sensitive soul, he introduces conceptual elements that, further developed, will end up by conducting to the ideas of "vital property" and of "vital principle" typical of the vitalistic thought of the 18th and 19th centuries.

The organism as ontological go-between: hybridity, boundaries and degrees of reality in its conceptual history.

The organism is neither a discovery like the circulation of the blood or the glycogenic function of the liver, nor a particular biological theory like epigenesis or preformationism. It is rather a concept which plays a series of roles--sometimes overt, sometimes masked--throughout the history of biology, and frequently in very normative ways, also shifting between the biological and the social. Indeed, it has often been presented as a key-concept in life science and the 'theorization' of Life, but conversely has also been the target of influential rejections: as just an instrument of transmission for the selfish gene, but also, historiographically, as part of an outdated 'vitalism'. Indeed, the organism, perhaps because it is experientially closer to the 'body' than to the 'molecule', is often the object of quasi-affective theoretical investments presenting it as essential, sometimes even as the pivot of a science or a particular approach to nature, while other approaches reject or attack it with equal force, assimilating it to a mysterious 'vitalist' ontology of extra-causal forces, or other pseudo-scientific doctrines. This paper does not seek to adjudicate between these debates, either in terms of scientific validity or historical coherence; nor does it return to the well-studied issue of the organism-mechanism tension in biology. Recent scholarship has begun to focus on the emergence and transformation of the concept of organism, but has not emphasized so much the way in which organism is a shifting, 'go-between' concept-invoked as 'natural' by some thinkers to justify their metaphysics, but then presented as value-laden by others, over and against the natural world. The organism as go-between concept is also a hybrid, a boundary concept or an epistemic limit case, all of which partly overlap with the idea of 'nomadic concepts'. Thereby the concept of organism continues to function in different contexts--as a heuristic, an explanatory challenge, a model of order, of regulation, etc.--despite having frequently been pronounced irrelevant and reduced to molecules or genes. Yet this perpetuation is far removed from any 'metaphysics of organism', or organismic biology.

Vital forces and organization: philosophy of nature and biology in Karl Friedrich Kielmeyer.

The historical literature on German life science at the end of the 18th century has tried to rehabilitate eighteenth century vitalism by stressing its difference from Naturphilosophie. Focusing on the work of Karl Friedrich Kielmeyer this paper argues that these positions are based on a historiographical bias and that the clear-cut boundary between German vitalism and Naturphilosophie is historically unattested. On the contrary, they both belong to the process of conceptual genealogy that contributed to the project of a general biology. The latter emerged as the science concerned with the laws that regulate the organization of living nature as a whole. The focus on organization was, at least partially, the result of the debate surrounding the notion of "vital force", which originated in the mid-eighteenth century and caused a shift from a regulative to a constitutive understanding of teleology.

The conquest of vitalism or the eclipse of organicism? The 1930s Cambridge organizer project and the social network of mid-twentieth-century biology.

In the 1930s, two concepts excited the European biological community: the organizer phenomenon and organicism. This essay examines the history of and connection between these two phenomena in order to address the conventional 'rise-and-fall' narrative that historians have assigned to each. Scholars promoted the 'rise-and-fall' narrative in connection with a broader account of the devitalizing of biology through the twentieth century. I argue that while limited evidence exists for the 'fall of the organizer concept' by the 1950s, the organicism that often motivated the organizer work had no concomitant fall--even during the mid-century heyday of molecular biology. My argument is based on an examination of shifting social networks of life scientists from the 1920s to the 1970s, many of whom attended or corresponded with members of the Cambridge Theoretical Biology Club (1932-1938). I conclude that the status and cohesion of these social networks at the micro scale was at least as important as macro-scale conceptual factors in determining the relative persuasiveness of organicist philosophy.

From the cell of Schwann to schwannoma--a century's fruition.

The word "schwannoma" is pervasive throughout the neurosurgical community. However, little is known about the origin of the cell of "Schwann cell," the manifestation of the tumor's nomenclature, or the prominent physicians who studied its etiopathogenesis. Schwann was a founding father of cellular theory and one of the greatest scientists of the 19th century. He not only proposed cell theory but also discovered the "secondary" nerve cell and hypothesized its possible function in myelination. It took a century to confirm Schwann's hypothesis. In 1954, Geren, aided by the electron microscope, demonstrated that the cell of Schwann is responsible for nerve myelination. Concurrently, researchers worked to understand the etiology and pathogenesis of peripheral nerve neoplasms. Several attempts were made; Older, Virchow, and von Recklinghausen were the first pioneers who worked on the classification of these neoplasms. However, Masson first used the word "schwannoma" to describe peripheral nerve neoplasms other than neuromas. His French colleague Nageotte used the term "peripheral-glioma" to denote these tumors. These schwannomas were considered to have a malignant course. In 1932, Penfield attempted to classify peripheral nerve neoplasms into 3 categories: peripheral fibroblastoma, peripheral glioma, and neurofibroma of von Recklinghausen. He classified "Verocay's neurinoma," "Masson's schwannoma," and "cerebellopontine angle" tumors as perineural fibroblastoma. He believed that these tumors have a non-nerve cell, non-Schwann cell origin. He classified the tumors arising from the Schwann cell sheath as peripheral gliomas and articulated, "If any tumors are to be called schwannomas, these should be." The neurofibroma of von Recklinghausen was recognized as a separate entity, as described by von Recklinghausen himself. Murray and Stout proposed that schwannomas are essentially benign in nature clarifying the abstruseness of the benign or malignant nature of schwannoma.